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We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman-type trade model with home market effects. We conduct a general analysis 
allowing for three different instruments: tariffs, export taxes and production subsidies. For each instrument, we consider 
unilateral trade policy without retaliation.
When carefully disentangling the different effects that determine policy makers’ choices and modeling general equilibrium 
effects  of  taxes/tariffs,  we  find  –  contrary  to  the  results  of  previous  studies  –  that  production  subsidies  are  always 
inefficiently low and driven by the incentives to improve the (welfare relevant) terms of trade.
In the cases of tariffs and export taxes results depend crucially on whether the free trade allocation is efficient. When 
starting from an allocation that is distorted because of monopolistic competition, the home market effect (and in the case 
of export taxes also the desire to correct for the monopolistic inefficiency) induces policy makers to set a tariff (an export 
subsidy). However, when monopolistic distortions are corrected, terms of trade effects dominate the choice of trade policy 
and lead to an import subsidy (an export tax).
JEL: F12, F13, F42.
Keywords: home market effect, terms of trade, tariffs and subsidies.
A tanulmány célja a kereskedelempolitika vizsgálata egy kétszektoros, Krugman-féle modellkeretben, amelyben megjelenik 
a hazai piaci hatás. Elemzésünkben három gazdaságpolitikai eszközre koncentrálunk: vám, exportadó, és termelési támo-
gatás. Mindegyik eszköz esetében az egyoldalú, ellenintézkedés nélküli esetet vizsgáljuk. Miután gondosan elkülönítjük a 
gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozókra gyakorolt különféle hatásokat, illetve figyelembe vesszük a vámok/adók általános egyen-
súlyi hatásait, korábbi tanulmányokkal ellentétben azt találjuk, hogy a termelési támogatások túlságosan alacsonyak, és a 
(jóléti szempontból releváns) cserearány javításának igénye határozza meg őket. Vám és exportadó esetén az eredmény attól 
függ, hogy a szabadpiaci egyensúly hatékony-e. Amennyiben a szabadpiaci egyensúlyt monopolisztikus versenyből adódó 
torzulások jellemzik, a hazai piaci hatás (illetve exportadó esetén a monopolisztikus torzulások korrekciójának igénye) arra 
ösztönzi a döntéshozókat, hogy vámot vessenek ki (exporttámogatást). Ha azonban a monopoltorzulások megszűntek, a 
cserearányhatások dominálnak és az optimális politika az importtámogatás (exportadó).
Abstract
ÖsszefoglalásMNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 6
1 Introduction
TheaimofthispaperistostudytradepolicyinaversionoftheKrugman(1980)modelofintra-industrytrade
with monopolistic competition and increasing returns. We consider a two country version of the Krugman
model with two sectors: one with monopolistic competition, increasing returns and iceberg trade costs and
one that features perfect competition and constant returns. Within this framework, we study the unilateral
incentives to set production subsidies/taxes, import subsidies/tariffs, as well as export taxes/subsidies.1
In our analysis, we disentangle three different effects that drive policy makers’ incentives to set trade policy
unilaterally and which they have to trade off against each other. First, a standard terms of trade externality
– the desire to manipulate international prices in favor of the domestic economy by decreasing the relative
price of imported bundles. Second, a home market (production relocation) externality. This externality leads
policy makers to induce ﬁrms to locate in the domestic economy, so that domestic consumers can save on
transport costs and beneﬁt from a lower price level. Third, a misallocation between the differentiated and the
homogeneous sector due to monopolistic pricing that implies a too low number of ﬁrms in the differentiated
sector.2
When a production subsidy/tax is the only instrument available, single country policy makers subsidize
domestic output, but never up to the level that would implement the Pareto-optimal allocation. The reason
is that the terms of trade externality always dominates the other effects. Lower subsidies imply lower relative
prices of importables in world markets, whereas the home market effect would call for over-subsidizing
production in order to attract ﬁrms to the domestic economy.
In the cases of import tariffs and export taxes, the novelty of our analysis is to show that optimal unilateral
policy choices depend crucially on whether the initial allocation is efﬁcient. There are two reasons for this.
On the one hand, when the initial allocation is inefﬁcient, the volume of trade is low because there are too
few ﬁrms in the differentiated sector.3 Consequently, the terms of trade externality is less relevant than in the
case of efﬁciency. On the other hand, the price level is higher because less varieties are available, therefore the
incentive to decrease it is stronger. Thus, the home market effect is more important than when the allocation
is Pareto-optimal.
Speciﬁcally, when starting from an inefﬁcient allocation – the case considered in the previous literature –
single countries’ policy makers subsidize domestic production using import tariffs or export subsidies. They
do this in order to save on transport costs (home market effect) and, in the case of export subsidies, also to
correct for the monopolistic distortion. In contrast, if the inefﬁciency of the initial allocation is eliminated
with production subsidies, the terms of trade externality dominates. Thus, policymakers ﬁnd it optimal to
reduce the number of domestic varieties using an import subsidy or an export tax.
Finally, if we allow for an elasticity of substitution between varieties that is larger than the trade elasticity, im-
port subsidies (export taxes) are optimal for most of the relevant parameter space, even when not correcting
the monopolistic distortions.
Our results differ from those of the previous literature that has analyzed trade policy in a two-sector Krug-
man model. There are several reasons for this. First, we consider income effects of trade and production
taxes, while previous contributions have either assumed that tariffs are a pure waste (Venables (1987), Ossa
(2008)) or that utility is quasi-linear (Helpman & Krugman (1989) Bagwell & Staiger (2009)). While these
assumptions guarantee analytical tractability, both eliminate important general equilibrium effects. Second,
1 We investigate cooperative and strategic determination of trade policy in Campolmi et al. (2010).
2 The inefﬁciency arises because there are two sectors in the model – a perfectly competitive one and one with monopolistic competition. In their seminal
paper, Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) showed that the market solution is not ﬁrst best Pareto optimal in their model and that subsidies on ﬁxed costs and on
marginal costs are required to implement it. More recently, Bilbiie et al. (2007) ﬁnd a similar distortion in a closed economy model with endogenous
variety once they introduce endogenous labor supply (a second sector).
3 In a symmetric equilibrium all trade is intra-industry.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 7
INTRODUCTION
we use an alternative deﬁnition of the terms of trade, which turns out to be extremely useful if one wants
to understand optimal trade policy choices. While the previous literature has considered relative prices of
individual varieties in world markets as the terms of trade, we deﬁne the welfare relevant terms of trade as
the relative optimal price index of imported goods.4 This deﬁnition highlights that also policy instruments,
which do not have a direct impact on world market prices of individual varieties (e.g. tariffs), have terms of
trade effects.5 This is because all policy instruments affect the number of domestic and foreign differentiated
varieties and therefore the welfare relevant price indices. Third, we are the ﬁrst to underline the role played
by the inefﬁciency of the initial allocation on trade policy. This allows to interpret existing results in a new
light.
For example, Venables (1987) interprets the result that a small production subsidy or an export subsidy
increases welfare in the light of a home market effect, while we show that the subsidy is always smaller than
the one that implements the Pareto-optimal allocation. This implies that domestic policy makers try to
improve their terms of trade rather than to increase the number of domestic ﬁrms above the efﬁcient level.
Still, they choose a positive level of subsidy because the number of ﬁrms in the decentralized equilibrium
without policy intervention is too low.6 Turning to his results on tariffs, which has recently been conﬁrmed
byOssa(2008)inastrategicsetting, heﬁndsthatacountry’swelfareisalwaysraisedbyaunilateralincreasein
its import tariffs because of the home market effect. However, we show that this result does not go through
and that the terms of trade effect dominates when the initial allocation is efﬁcient.7
Finally, Bagwell&Staiger(2009)consideravariantofthetwo-sectorKrugmanmodelwithquasi-linearutility
and allow policy makers to simultaneously choose tariffs and export taxes in a strategic setting. They show
that in this special case Nash-equilibrium policy choices are explained exclusively by the desire to manipulate
international prices and not by the home market externality. We study strategic interaction in our more
general framework in Campolmi et al. (2010).
Summarizing, the main contributions of our paper are the following ones. We isolate the different incentives
that determine policy makers’ objectives and show how they interact. Moreover, we show that home market
effects never determine trade policy in the case of production subsidies/taxes and that when considering
tariffs and export taxes as the trade policy instrument results depend crucially on the (in)efﬁciency of the
initial allocation. We also clarify what the welfare relevant terms of trade are in this model and make clear
that both home market and terms of trade effects coexist even when we consider a linear outside good and
tariffs as the only policy instrument.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section sets up the model and Section 3 presents the equilibrium
conditions. In the following sections we discuss the deﬁnition of the terms of trade and the different incen-
tives that determine policy makers’ choices. Section 6 is dedicated to studying trade policy, while Section 7
concludes.
4 This welfare based deﬁnition of the terms of trade is common in the international macroeconomics literature. See for example Corsetti & Pesenti (2001)
and Epifani & Gancia (2009).
5 This statement holds true with constant returns in the homogeneous sector (which implies factor price equalization).
6 Romer (1994) emphasizes that the effect of trade policy on the number of differentiated varieties in the economy has large welfare effects that dominate
other effects of trade policy (such as terms of trade effects). Here, we show that this statement is correct as long as the number of varieties is inefﬁciently
low.
7 As shown by Gros (1987), this would not be the case in a one-sector economy where it is always optimal to set an import tariff due to terms of trade
effects. In the one-sector model, the number of varieties is ﬁxed and the competitive equilibrium (with or without trade) is Pareto-optimal. Hence,
neither monopolistic distortions nor the home market effect play any role for policy makers’ incentives. At the same time, without the linear outside
good, trade policy has an effect on factor prices and affects the terms of trade. Thus, our results are consistent with his.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 8
2 The Model
The world economy consists of two countries: Home and Foreign. Each country produces a homogenous
good and a continuum of differentiated goods. All goods are tradable but only the differentiated goods are
subject to transport costs. The differentiated goods sector is characterized by monopolistic competition
while there is perfect competition in the homogenous good sector. Both countries are identical in terms of
preferences, production technology and market structure. In what follows Foreign variables will be denoted
by a (*).
HOUSEHOLDS
Household’s utility function in the Home country is given by:
U(C,Z) ≡ CαZ1−α (1)
where C aggregates over the varieties of differentiated goods, Z represents the homogeneous good and α is
the expenditure share of the differentiated bundle in the aggregate consumption basket. While the homo-
geneous good is identical across countries, each country produces a different subset of differentiated goods.
In particular, N varieties are produced in the Home country while N∗ are produced by Foreign. We allow
for a general speciﬁcation of the consumption aggregators with two different elasticity of substitutions, one





























￿ > 1 (3)
Foreign consumers have an analogous utility function. Let p(h) (p∗(h)) be the price paid by Home (Foreign)
consumers for domestically produced varieties while p(f ) (p∗(f )) is the price paid by home (foreign) con-
sumers for imported varieties. In general, p(h) ￿= p∗(f ) and p∗(h) ￿= p(f ) because of transport costs, taxes
on production, on imports and on exports. Households inelastically supply L units of labor. The budget
constraint of Home consumers reads as follows:
PC + pZZ =W L+T, (4)
where W is the wage, pZ is the price of the homogeneous good, P is the price of the differentiated bundle
and T is a lump sum tax/transfer which depends on the tariff/subsidy scheme adopted by the domestic
government and which will be deﬁned later. The solution to the consumer problem gives the following
demand functions and price indices:
• Home’s and Foreign’s demand for differentiated varieties produced by Home:











i.e. the model collapses to the standard one considered in this literature. All
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FIRMS IN THE DIFFERENTIATED SECTOR
Firms in the differentiated sector operate in a regime of monopolistic competition. They pay a ﬁxed cost in
terms of labor f and then produce with a constant returns to scale technology:
y(h) = LC(h)− f , (14)
where LC(h) is the amount of labor allocated to the production of the differentiated good h. Goods sold
in the foreign market are subject to an iceberg transport cost τ ≥ 1. Governments in both countries can
use three policy instruments: a production tax/subsidy on ﬁxed and marginal costs (τC), a tariff/subsidy
on imports (τI) and a tax/subdsidy on exports (τX).9 A (*) indicates the Foreign policy instruments. We
assume that subsidies (taxes) are received (paid) directly by the ﬁrms. Equivalently, we could have consumers
receiving (paying) them from (to) the government.
Given the constant price elasticity of demand, optimal prices charged by Home ﬁrms in the domestic market
are a ﬁxed markup over their perceived marginal cost τCW and optimal prices paid by Foreign consumers




W p∗(f ) = τ∗
IτXτp(h) (15)





W ∗ p(f ) = τIτ∗
Xτp∗(h) (16)
HOMOGENEOUS GOOD SECTOR
Both countries can produce a homogenous good using the same production technology:
QZ = LZ (17)
where LZ is the amount of labor allocated to producing the homogeneous good. The good is sold in a
perfectly competitive market without trade costs. Consequently, the price equals marginal cost and is the
same in both countries:
pZ =W pZ = p∗
Z (18)
Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale, and as long as the homogeneous good is produced in both
countries in equilibrium, which we will assume for the rest of the paper, there is factor price equalization:
pZ = p∗
Z =W =W ∗ (19)
9 In general τi indicates the gross subsidy/tax for i ∈ {C,I,X} i.e., τi < 1 indicates a subsidy, τi > 1 indicates a tax while when τi = 1 the policy
instrument is not used.
10 Following the previous literature (Venables (1987), Ossa (2008)), we assume that tariffs and export taxes are charged ad valorem on the factory gate
price augmented by transport costs. This implies that transport services are taxed.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 11
THE MODEL
GOVERNMENT
The government of each country disposes of three ﬁscal instruments. A production tax/subsidy (τC), a
tariff/subsidy on imports (τI) and a tax/subsidy on exports (τX). All government revenues are redistributed
to consumers through a lump sum transfer T. The government is assumed to run a balanced budget. Hence,







(y(h)+ f )dh = T (20)
Total government income consists of import revenues charged on imports of differentiated goods gross of
transport costs and foreign export taxes; export taxes charged on exports gross of transport costs; and the
production tax revenues.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 12
3 Equilibrium
Given that ﬁrms share the same production technology, the equilibrium is symmetric – all ﬁrms in the
differentiated sector of a given country charge the same price and produce the same quantity. This implies

















FREE ENTRY IN THE DIFFERENTIATED SECTOR










− f τCW = 0 (23)
Combining the optimal pricing rule with equation (23), we obtain:
c(h)+τc∗(f ) = (￿−1)f (24)
Substituting the demand functions into (24) and using (21) and (22), the zero proﬁt condition for ﬁrms in the











































GOODS AND LABOR MARKET CLEARING CONDITIONS
For each differentiated variety produced by Home the following market clearing condition must be satisﬁed:
y(h) = c(h)+τc∗(f ) (27)
Therefore, the zero proﬁt condition (24) and market clearing (27) imply that the production of each variety
is ﬁxed and the same is true for the varieties produced by Foreign:




I τX = c∗(f )τp(h).MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 13
EqUILIBRIUM
y(h) = (￿−1)f y∗(h) = (￿−1)f (28)
The market clearing condition for the homogeneous good is given by:
QZ +Q∗
Z = Z +Z∗, (29)














Finally, equilibrium in the labor market implies that L = LC + LZ with LC = NLC(h) in the symmetric
equilibrium. Making use of (14) and (28), we have:
LC = N￿f QZ = L−N￿f (31)
and for Foreign:
L∗
C = N∗￿f Q∗
Z = L∗ −N∗￿f (32)
BALANCED TRADE CONDITION
The model is solved under the assumption of ﬁnancial autarky, so trade is balanced. Net-exports of the
homogenous good by Home are deﬁned as:














The left hand side of the above expression is the sum of net export value of the homogeneous goods and the
value of exports of differentiated varieties, while the right hand side is the value of imports of differentiated
varieties.






























12 Import tariffs/subsidies are collected directly by the governments at the border so they do not enter into this condition.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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PRICE INDICES
Using the optimal pricing rules (15) and (18) together with equations (17) and (21) (and the corresponding

























































The free entry conditions for the two countries (25) and (26), the market clearing condition for the homo-
geneous good (30) and the balanced trade condition (35) together with the expressions for price indices just
derived and (31) and (32) fully characterize the equilibrium of the economy. For the case η = ￿ it is possible to
solve the system explicitly for N and N∗. The expressions for these variables can be found in the Appendix.
Before going into the details of trade policy choice under different instruments, in the next two sections we
clarify two main points. First, the relevant deﬁnition of the terms of trade. Second, the different economic
incentives that determine unilateral trade policies.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 15
4 The Welfare Relevant Terms of Trade
One crucial aspect of our study of policy makers’ incentives to set trade policy is to deﬁne the terms of trade
in the way that is relevant for policy makers. All previous contributions in this literature (Venables (1987),
Helpman & Krugman (1989), Ossa (2008), Bagwell & Staiger (2009)) have deﬁned the terms of trade as the








. Because of the assumption
of a linear outside good, relative wages are one. Consequently, only export and production taxes can affect
these relative prices.
However, these are not the relative prices in international markets that are welfare relevant. Domestic con-
sumers – and thus domestic policy makers – are interested in how many units of foreign bundles they can
buy for a given amount of domestic bundles. This relation is reﬂected in the trade balance condition (34).













CF, where the left hand side is
the value of domestic exports and the right hand side is the value of domestic imports. In this relation all
variables are written in terms of optimal consumption indices.13 Consider the case in which Home imports
the homogeneous good (ZX = 0). In this case an increase in the relative world market price (before tariffs








consumers because the amount of Foreign differentiated goods they can buy for a given amount of domestic
goods decreases. Similarly, an increase of the relative price of homogeneous goods in international markets
pz/(ττXPH) in terms of domestic exports also lowers the purchasing power of domestic exports in terms of
Foreign goods.
As a consequence, the two relative world market prices that are of interest for domestic policy makers – and
thus the welfare relevant deﬁnition of the terms of trade – are (τ∗
XP∗
H)/(τXPH) and pz/(ττXPH) if Home is
an importer of the homogeneous good.14
















. Hence, the relative international price of imports of differentiated goods in terms of exports
depends positively on the relative number of varieties produced domestically. It also depends directly on
domestic and Foreign production subsidies τC, τ∗
C and export taxes τX, τ∗
X. Note that the previous literature
has only considered the second part of the above expression as the terms of trade, omitting the part that





￿−1. Intuitively, an increase in N∗ for a given N
increases the utility derived from a given expenditure on the Foreign bundle.
It becomes clear that with the deﬁnition of the terms of trade we propose here, all policy instruments (pro-
duction subsidies, tariffs and export taxes) affect the terms of trade indirectly, by changing the distribution
of ﬁrms located in the domestic and in the Foreign economy.
13 The consumption indices are the Hicksian demand functions for the respective bundles, which minimize expenditure for a given utility level.
14 If Home is an exporter of the homogeneous good, (ττ∗
XP∗
H)/pz is the second relevant relative price.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 16
5 Single Country Policy Makers’ Incentives
In this section we clarify the role played by different inefﬁciencies/externalities in affecting a country’s deci-
sion over its trade policy.
For the case commonly studied in the literature η = ￿, it is possible to derive closed form solutions for the
equilibrium allocations and prices. In that case we can use the representative consumer’s indirect utility
function to disentangle the different effects that determine unilateral trade policy choices. In the rest of this
section and whenever we want to provide analytical results, we will restrict preferences to this special case.












The ﬁrst term, which can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the real wage, is decreasing in the relative
price of the differentiated bundle. The second term is income in terms of the homogeneous good (labor).












Thus, trade policy affects indirect utility through two channels. On the one hand, it impacts on indirect
utility through its effect on the relative price of the differentiated good. Since P
pz









1−￿, where s = N
N+N∗, trade policy affects relative prices both directly
and indirectly (through changes in s and in (N +N∗)). On the other hand, indirect utility changes through
trade policy’s impact on domestic income.
Note that income can be expressed from the trade balance.16 Using the deﬁnition of consumption indices,






















































































15 See appendix for derivations.
16 Alternatively, income in terms of the homogeneous good can also be expressed as L+T/pz. However, starting from the trade balance makes it
easier to identify the different economic channels.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 17













































































































We are now ready to discuss the different channels that determine unilateral trade policy.
First, with positive transport costs, there is a home market (production relocation) externality. Domestic
policy makers try to induce ﬁrms to relocate to the domestic economy, so that domestic consumers can
beneﬁt from lower prices, since they save on transport costs. In terms of indirect utility, this effect works
through a decrease in P/pz by changing the relative weights of domestic and Foreign varieties, s and (1− s).
Second, there is a terms of trade externality. Countries have market power both in import and in export
markets – they face an upward sloping export supply and a downward sloping import demand curve. Hence,
single country policy makers try to render the relative prices of imported bundles cheaper in order to maxi-
mize the total purchasing power of domestically produced goods in international markets. In this way they
can increase domestic income by importing more for each unit of exports.
In fact, the terms of trade externality is an income effect.17 Condition (41) clariﬁes exactly this. In this
expression B1 is the impact of the policy instrument on the domestic terms of trade for given quantities of
imports. If the domestic country is an importer of the homogeneous good the ﬁrst term is negative. Hence,
if the change in the policy instrument reduces the relative import price of homogeneous goods – for example
by reducing the number of domestic varieties – this affects domestic income positively. The second term is
the relative price of imports of the differentiated bundle in terms of exports of the differentiated bundle. A
reduction in this price also increases domestic income. It is clear that there is an inherent trade-off between
the terms of trade effect and the home market externality, since the ﬁrst implies a reduction in the number
of domestically produced varieties while the second one calls for an increase.18
Third, there is an efﬁciency effect of trade policy. Without trade policy intervention, the number of differenti-
ated varieties at the world level, N +N∗ is too low relative to the amount of production of the homogeneous
good. This is due to monopolistic price setting in the differentiated sector. In particular, if not corrected
by the production subsidy, the price markup charged by ﬁrms in the differentiated sector leads to an equi-
librium with an inefﬁciently low number of varieties and an inefﬁciently high level of production of the
homogeneous good because the marginal rate of substitution between the two sectors does not equal the
marginal rate of transformation. In order to correct for such an inefﬁciency, policy makers have an incentive
to subsidize production. By doing so, they can either completely (production subsidy) or partially (import
or export subsidy) eliminate the price markup in the differentiated sector, thus increasing the world number
of varieties, N + N∗. This monopolistic distortion incentive enters P/pZ where it induces policy makers
to increase N +N∗. Hence, it is easy to confuse the desire to correct the inefﬁciency due to monopolistic
competition with the home market effect. In addition, both the home market effect and the efﬁciency effect
enter I/pz throughthe termB2 thatreﬂects theopportunity costinterms ofproduction ofthehomogeneous
good of increasing N.
17 This is well known. See, for example, Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996), Chapter 1.
18 As explained below, B2 is the opportunity cost in terms of production of the homogeneous good of a change in domestic production of differentiated
varieties that is caused by a change in trade policy . The terms B3 and B4 measure Foreign substitution and income effects induced by changes in
domestic trade policy. Other things equal, an increase in Foreign demand for domestic goods due to a fall in their relative price or due to higher Foreign
income, augments domestic income. This is because it allows Home to import more Foreign goods. Similarly, B5 is the domestic substitution effect.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 18
6 Trade Policy
We now study optimal trade policy without retaliation for production taxes (τC,τ∗
C), import tariffs (τI,τ∗
I)
and export taxes (τX,τ∗
X). In each case, we analyze only the choice of one instrument at a time, so we do
not allow, for example, policy makers to set simultaneously import tariffs and export taxes.19 A detailed
analysis of coordinated trade policy and strategic trade policy interaction for each instrument is provided in
Campolmi et al. (2010).20
In order to better understand the results for the different policy instruments, it is useful to consider the
efﬁcient allocation as a benchmark. While we refer to Campolmi et al. (2010) for the formal derivations,
here it is enough to summarize the main result. The ﬁrst best allocation can be reached by setting the
production subsidy in each country at the level required to eliminate the price markup in the differentiated
sector (τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ , τI = τ∗
I = τX = τ∗
X = 1).
For each of the policy instruments we then investigate two cases. Under the ﬁrst hypothesis, the monopo-
listic distortion in the differentiated sector is not corrected (i.e. τC = τ∗
C = 1), while under the second one
it is offset by an appropriate production subsidy (i.e. τC = τ∗
C = (￿−1)/￿). These two scenarios allow to
disentangle the consequences of the inefﬁciency caused by monopolistic pricing in the differentiated sector
from the other effects.
For comparison with the existing literature, our main set of results is derived under the assumptions η = ￿.
For this case we provide analytical proofs.
We also show how results change when η ￿= ￿. In this case the general equilibrium and the optimal policy
problem do not have explicit analytical solutions. Thus, we have to rely on numerical simulations.
PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES
In this section we consider the case of a production subsidy/tax. We assume that this is the only available
policy instrument, i.e. we set τI = τ∗
I = τX = τ∗
X = 1.
Benchmark case: η = ￿
We start from a situation where none of the two countries is using the production subsidy (i.e. τC = τ∗
C = 1)
and ask what the optimal choice of τC for Home would be under the assumption that Foreign keeps τ∗
C = 1.
We ﬁrst present a numerical example to illustrate the different economic mechanisms at work.21
Figure 1 shows the behavior of some key variables for both countries as functions of the domestic production
subsidy. An increase in the domestic subsidy increases demand for domestic differentiated goods and thus,
other things equal, generates positive proﬁts for producers located in the domestic country. This causes ﬁrms
in the differentiated sector to enter the domestic market and to leave the Foreign one until zero proﬁts are
reached. Hence, the subsidy to production causes agglomeration. Overall, the increase in N more than
compensates the decrease in N∗ and pushes the number of varieties available at the world level closer to
19 Hence, when policy makers choose import tariffs, τX and τ∗
X are always set equal to one. This is an important difference with respect to the analysis
in Bagwell & Staiger (2009).
20 In that paper we investigate optimal trade policies both from the perspective of single country policy makers, studying the Nash equilibrium of the game,
and from the perspective of a cooperative authority that maximizes average welfare of the world economy.
21 For our numerical example we consider ￿ = 4 and transport costs τ = 1.4, which are standard values in the literature. Anderson & Wincoop (2004)
estimate an international trade cost excluding policy barriers of around 60% for industrialized countries. This splits into a transport cost of 21% and
a 32% international trade costs excluding policy barriers, such as language and information costs (0.6=1.21*1.32-1). We view this as rather high but
our results are perfectly robust to choosing this number for trade costs. We set the expenditure share on the differentiated sector α = 0.4, as in Fujita
et al. (1999). We use this calibration throughout the paper.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 19
 
efﬁciency. This comes at the cost of worsening domestic terms of trade. Domestic utility as a function of the
subsidy is hump-shaped, reﬂecting this trade-off. Overall, the terms of trade externality predominates and
utility is maximized at a level of domestic subsidy that is strictly smaller than the efﬁcient one (τC = ￿−1
￿ =
0.75). Interestingly, even though now production is more efﬁcient at the world level, Foreign is worse off.
This is due to the higher transportation costs Foreign consumers have to pay after the relocation of ﬁrms to
Home.
Toabstractfromtheroleplayedbythedesiretocorrecttheinefﬁciencycausedbymonopolisticcompetition,
we run a second experiment starting from the ﬁrst best allocation, i.e. we set τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ . This is done
in Figure 2. A unilateral decrease in the domestic subsidy from the efﬁcient level increases domestic utility,
even though it lowers domestic consumption of differentiated goods. Hence, the optimal strategy given
that the other country chooses an efﬁcient subsidy, is to deviate to a smaller subsidy. This causes exit of
ﬁrms in Home and entry in Foreign and improves domestic terms of trade, while lowering the aggregate
level of efﬁciency. Home is under-subsidizing and not over-subsidizing domestic production as the home
market effect would require. We can then conclude that in the case of production subsidies the terms of trade
externality dominates.22
Having gained some intuition, we now move to proving these statements formally.23 First, we show that an
increase in the domestic subsidy indeed increases the number of domestic ﬁrms at the expense of Foreign.
Lemma 1 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ∗
C ≤ 1 then ∂ N
∂ τC
< 0, ∂ N∗
∂ τC





Lemma 1 implies that, starting from a symmetric equilibrium where either no country is using the subsidy
or both are subsidizing at the same rate, a unilateral increase in the domestic subsidy τC
24 increases N at the
cost of a reduction in N∗. At the same time the world level of differentiated varieties, N +N∗, increases.
Next, we decompose the welfare effects of an increase in the domestic production subsidy using (39) and the
following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ∗







Increasing the production subsidy has two opposing effects on indirect utility. On the one hand, it increases
indirect utility by lowering the domestic price index. This welfare gain reﬂects both the home market effect
and the reduction in the monopolistic distortion. Both increase indirect utility by improving the purchasing
power for a given income level. On the other hand, it decreases indirect utility by reducing domestic income.
Intuition for the sources of this welfare loss can be gained from (41). The term B1 > 025 implies that an
22 An alternative interpretation of the difference in outcomes depending on the (in)efﬁciency of the initial allocation could be based on Grossman &
Helpman (1991), pages 82-83. The authors shows (in a closed economy setting where the equilibrium number of varieties is efﬁcient) that the
introduction of an an additional variety to the economy has two effects: 1) a gain in consumer surplus and 2) a proﬁt destruction effect (negative
income effect). When starting from an efﬁcient number of varieties, these effects exactly cancel each other. If, however, – as in our case – the number
of varieties is inefﬁciently low, the gain in consumer surplus from more variety outweighs the proﬁt destruction effect. Thus, a policy maker would
subsidize production of differentiated goods in order to increase variety. This is also true in our setup when considering the perspective of a world
policy maker that maximizes average welfare of the world economy. In our setting things are more complicated from the domestic policy maker’s
perspective, since domestic income is determined in world general equilibrium. Thus, domestic policy makers do not trade of the world’s marginal
gain in consumer surplus against the world’s marginal income effect. Instead, they take into account that in the presence of trade costs introducing
an additional domestic variety cuts disproportionately more into the proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms than into the one of Foreign ﬁrms, causing negative
income effects at Home. We interpret this effect as a worsening in the welfare relevant terms of trade. Alternatively, one could split the change in the
welfare-relevant terms of trade into a proﬁt destruction effect and a change in the terms of trade of individual varieties (which worsen because of the
production subsidy). The conclusions remain the same.
23 All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
24 Recall that higher subsidy means moving τC from 1 to 0.
25 The proof of the signs of the B’s can be found in the appendix.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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increase in the production subsidy causes the terms of trade to move against Home. Moreover, the cost of
reducing monopolistic distortions augments as indicated by the term B2 > 0 which captures the domestic
opportunity cost in terms of reduced production of homogeneous goods.26 Whether the price or the income
effect predominates crucially depends on the (in)efﬁciency of the initial allocation. This is proved in the next
Theorem:
Theorem 1 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. Then:
(1) ∂ W
∂ τC

















> 0 if τ < 4 or ￿−1 > α.
The ﬁrst part of Theorem 1 states that starting from a free trade equilibrium countries always have an incen-
tive to set a small subsidy. Parts 2 and 3 state that this subsidy is always27 inefﬁciently low, independently of
whether the other country also subsidizes production. We therefore conclude that the terms of trade effect
always outweighs the other effects in the choice of the production subsidy. This is an important result be-
cause it contradicts the standard wisdom that in the two-sector Krugman model countries have an incentive
to oversubsidize production in order to attract more ﬁrms (Venables (1987)).
The intuition for Theorem 1 is the following. At the free trade allocation the gains from lowering the price
index are high due to the inefﬁciently low number of varieties. In addition, the opportunity cost from
reducing the homogeneous good is negligible due to its abundance. At the same time, the income effect is
small because the volume of trade is low, thus the terms of trade externality is weak. However, as we move
towards the efﬁcient allocation, the gain from lowering the price index decreases while the opportunity cost
increases, thus weakening both the home market and the inefﬁciency considerations. Moreover, the terms of
trade externality is strengthen as the volume of trade increases.
Implications of η ￿= ￿
Next, we check if the previous results generalize to the case η < ￿.28 The main advantage of this more general
speciﬁcation is that we can shut off the home market effect29 (by setting τ = 1) or/and the monopolistic dis-
tortion (by letting ￿ → ∞). The drawback of this more general model is that it cannot be solved analytically,
so we have to rely on simulations.
In Figure 3 we report both the subsidy that implements the ﬁrst best allocation (top) and the optimal do-
mestic subsidy/tax (bottom) for the case when τ∗
C is set to one. We consider τ ∈ [1,2] and ￿ ∈ [2,8].30
26 There are also some other effects but all go in the same direction as the home market effect. The Foreign substitution effect is positive ( B3 < 0), since
Foreign demand shift towards Home differentiated varieties and this more than compensates for the shift of Foreign demand towards homogeneous
goods. In the case in which Foreign sets a positive subsidy, there is a positive income effect in Foreign (B4 < 0). The increase in the domestic subsidy
increases Foreign income because it reduces the Foreign subsidy bill through its effect on ﬁrm delocation. Finally, Home demand shifts away from
Foreign varieties and away from homogeneous goods. This also has a positive effect on domestic income ( B5 < 0).
27 Note that the third part of the theorem is always satisﬁed for ￿ ≥ 2, a standard value for the trade elasticity.
28 η ≤ ￿ guarantees that demand for varieties is increasing in the sectoral price index.
29 With η = ￿ and no transport costs domestic and foreign varieties are perfect substitutes, so that a positive production subsidy set by one country
induces the whole differentiated sector to locate in that country i.e. it induces full specialization.
30 Given that η ≤ ￿, for this exercise we set η = 2 in order to study also cases with very strong inefﬁciency due to monopolistic distortion.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 21
TRADE POLICY
Several things are worth noticing. First, the efﬁcient production subsidy does not depend on the level of
transport cost and approaches one (no subsidy) as ￿ increases. Second, the domestic country always chooses
a production subsidy lower than the efﬁcient one, independently of the level of the monopolistic distortion
and the level of the transport costs. Third, without the home market effect (τ = 1) and with sufﬁciently low
monopolistic distortions (high ￿) the terms of trade externality becomes strong enough to induce domestic
policy makers to tax production at a positive rate. Results are qualitatively the same when considering the
case τC = ￿−1
￿ .31
TARIFFS
Here, we explore what drives single country policy makers’ incentives when the only instrument available
to them is an import tariff. Again, we analyze the impact of a unilateral change in the domestic tariff in the
absence of Foreign policy intervention (τ∗
I = 1).
Benchmark case: η = ￿
First, we study the effects of a unilateral change in the domestic tariff when the number of varieties is inef-
ﬁciently low (i.e. τC = τ∗
C = 1). In this scenario a positive tariff improves domestic welfare. This result is
consistent with Venables (1987) and Ossa (2008) and can be explained as follows.
When unilaterally setting a tariff/subsidy on imports (see Figure 4), the domestic policy maker faces a trade
off between different effects. On the one hand, a tariff induces ﬁrms to relocate to the domestic economy and
allows domestic consumers to save on transport costs. On the other hand, a tariff worsens domestic terms of
tradeandexacerbatestheinefﬁciencyduetomonopolisticcompetitionbyreducingN+N∗, thetotalnumber
ofthevarietiesproducedinthedifferentiatedsector. Differentlyfromthecaseoftheproductionsubsidy, here
the home market effect prevails: a tariff on imports increases domestic welfare by boosting consumption in
the differentiated and in the homogenous sectors. The impact of a unilateral change in the domestic tariff
on the terms of trade is weaker than in the case of the other policy instruments because tariffs affect terms
of trade only through their indirect impact on the relative number of varieties ( N
N∗). At the same time, the
potential efﬁciencygain ofsubsidizing imports issmaller than theone ofa production subsidysince tariffsdo
not allow to correct distortions in the price of domestically produced goods. However, under the assumption
that the monopolistic distortion is removed by a production subsidy (Figure 5), the optimal unilateral policy
is an import subsidy. An import subsidy renders local differentiated goods relatively more expensive and
induces households to increase their demand for Foreign goods. As a consequence, ﬁrms agglomerate in the
Foreign economy and the number of domestic varieties is reduced while the Foreign one is boosted. This
increases the domestic price level but also improves domestic terms of trade, which allows Home to import
more differentiated goods for each unit of exports. In other words, when the monopolistic distortion is
removed by an appropriate production subsidy, the terms of trade externality more than compensates the
rise in transport cost generated by an import subsidy.
We now turn to a more formal analysis. First, we show that an increase in the domestic tariff always increases
the number of domestic varieties at the expense of Foreign. In addition, setting a higher tariff always reduces
the total number of differentiated varieties. Lemma 3 summarizes these results.
Lemma 3 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1, 0 < α < 1 and τI = τ∗
I = 1. Then, when τC = τ∗
C = 1 or τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1










31 The ﬁgure is not reported to save space but is available on request.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 22
Again, we can decompose the welfare effects of an increase in the domestic tariff using (39). We ﬁrst consider
the case in which the initial allocation is inefﬁcient.












When there are no policy interventions a positive tariff always increases welfare. The mechanism behind this
is the home market effect, which increases the relative weight of cheap domestic varieties in the domestic
consumption basket. This outcome dominates the negative effect on the world number of varieties that
exacerbates the inefﬁciencies due to the monopolistic distortions. Lemma 4 formally proves the impact of
tariffs on the Home price index and on domestic income. It conﬁrms Venables (1987)’ and Ossa (2008)’s
results and their claim that in their analysis (where there is no correction of the monopolistic distortion)
ignoring income effects by considering tariffs to be a pure waste is not a restrictive assumption. In fact, in
this special case the income effect due to a tariff is always positive and reinforces the home market effect.32
However, results turn around when we consider an initial allocation that is efﬁcient:













According to Lemma 5, as long as ￿ − 1 > α, a tariff renders domestic differentiated goods cheaper even
when the monopolistic inefﬁciency is completely offset by an appropriate production subsidy. Conversely
the income effect is negative in this case. This switch in the sign of the derivative of income can be explained
as follows. When starting from an efﬁcient equilibrium, the volume of trade is larger than when starting
from an inefﬁcient equilibrium because the total number of varieties in the differentiated sector is higher.
Therefore, the income loss due to a terms of trade worsening is larger as well. Similarly, the opportunity cost
in terms of homogenous good of increasing the domestic production in the differentiated sector is higher
because homogeneous goods are no longer inefﬁciently abundant.
Theorem 2 formally proves that the optimal unilateral tariff is positive when starting from a free trade allo-
cation and negative (an import subsidy) when starting from the Pareto-optimal allocation implemented by a
production subsidy.
Theorem 2 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ∗
C = 1, then ∂ W
∂ τI
|τI=τ∗
I =1 > 0. However, if τC = τ∗
C =
￿−1
￿ then ∂ W
∂ τI
|τI=τ∗
I =1 < 0.
On the one hand, the ﬁrst part of Theorem 2 conﬁrms Venables (1987)’s and Ossa (2008)’s result that the
optimalunilateraltradepolicyisapositivetariff,evenwhenweallowforredistributionoftariffrevenues. On
the other hand, the second part of Theorem 2 makes clear that this result depends crucially on whether the
initial allocation is efﬁcient. When starting from the Pareto optimal allocation, the optimal unilateral policy
turns out to be an import subsidy. Like in the case of the production subsidy, at the efﬁcient allocation
the high volume of trade strengthen the terms of trade externality. Simultaneously, the relative low price
level implies a weak home market effect and a high opportunity cost of reducing the production of the
homogeneous good.
32 If we look at the decomposition of (41), it becomes clear that the income effect is positive because the terms of trade effect is dominated by other
effects. A positive tariff implies a shift in Foreign demand towards domestic varieties (B3 > 0). Similarly, domestic demand shifts away from Foreign
varieties ( B5 > 0). Both effects increase domestic income. In contrast, the terms of trade externality and the opportunity cost decrease income
(B1 < 0, B2 < 0). Finally, the Foreign income effect, B4, is zero, since there is no Foreign policy intervention.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 23
 
Implications of η ￿= ￿
Here we check if these results are robust to allowing ￿ to be different from η.
Again, let us ﬁrst treat a situation where the production subsidies τC and τ∗
C are set equal to one. Figure
6 plots the optimal tariff/subsidy on imports as functions of the elasticity of substitution among varieties
￿ ∈ (2,8) and the iceberg cost τ ∈ [1,2] with η being equal to 2.
Consider ﬁrst the case τ = 1. This implies that the home market effect is absent and the only incentives
for policy makers are terms of trade effects and the elimination of monopolistic distortions. Consequently,
the optimal policy is an import subsidy (i.e. τI < 1). As ￿ becomes larger and larger, policy makers are
less willing to subsidize imports (i.e. the optimal import subsidy tends to one). When ￿ increases, the
differentiated sector converges to a competitive sector which produces a single variety and the elasticity of
N with respect to tariffs becomes zero. As a consequence, both motives (the correction of the monopolistic
distortion and the incentive to improve the terms of trade) for subsidizing imports vanish.
Moving next to positive but sufﬁciently low levels of transport costs, single country policy makers still ﬁnd
it optimal to subsidize imports while for high transport costs the optimal policy is a tariff. The intuition
is straightforward: while terms of trade effects and monopolistic distortions determine policy choices for
low transport costs, the home market effect prevails for high transport costs. Note, however, that if ￿ is
sufﬁciently bigger than η, the optimal policy is an import subsidy even for transport costs of around 40%.
We can then conclude that the results of Venables (1987) and Ossa (2008) are not robust to the plausible case
in which the elasticity of substitution between varieties is greater than the trade elasticity, even when we start
from an inefﬁcient allocation.33
EXPORT TAXES
Finally, we brieﬂy discuss the case of export taxes under the assumption that τI = τ∗
I = τ∗
X = 1.
Benchmark case: η = ￿
Once more, in the ﬁrst scenario we study unilateral deviations from free trade under the assumption that
the monopolistic distortion has not been eliminated. Figure 7 shows how a deviation to a positive subsidy
on exports that attracts more ﬁrms to the domestic economy and increases the overall number of varieties
available at the word level improves domestic welfare. The intuition is the same as in the production subsidy
case.34
The second scenario (Figure 8) considers the case where the monopolistic distortion has been eliminated by
production subsidies (τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ ). Now a unilateral deviation to a positive tax on exports, that relocates
ﬁrms to the Foreign economy and induces an overall reduction in the number of differentiated varieties,
is welfare improving since it improves domestic terms of trade. Again, at the efﬁcient allocation, the high
trade volume leads to a strong terms of trade externality. At the same time, the price level is low and the
opportunity cost of reducing production of the homogeneous god is sizable, thus implying a weak home
market externality.
33 Our ﬁnding that a positive import subsidy is optimal if the monopolistic inefﬁciency is corrected remains valid independently of the values of τ and ￿.
The ﬁgure is omitted to save space but is available from the authors on request.
34 Gains from reducing the price level are high and opportunity costs of reducing Z are low because the number of differentiated varieties is too low. At
the same time, the terms of trade externality is weak due to the low trade volume.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Implications of η ￿= ￿
In Figure 9 we report the optimal domestic export tax/subsidy for the case τC = τ∗
C = 1 and τ∗
X = 1
for different values of ￿ and τ. While the home market effect and the monopolistic distortion call for a
subsidy, in the benchmark case the terms of trade externality would require a tax and the ﬁrst two effects
predominate. Figure 9 shows that this result does not go through in a more general setup where we allow
for the intra-industry elasticity ￿ to exceed the trade elasticity η. On the one hand, one might consider this
result as not so surprising given that, by increasing ￿, we are reducing the monopolistic distortion and also,
as explained earlier, the home market externality. On the other hand, ￿ needs to be only marginally bigger
than η for the optimal strategy to be an export tax, thus underlining the weakness of the previous result.
When considering the case τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ , it is always optimal to set an export tax, independently on the
level of τ and ￿, thus the terms of trade and revenue externalities always predominate in this context.35
35 To save space we do not include this ﬁgure. The relevant ﬁgure is available on request.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 25
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied unilateral trade policy in a two-sector variant of the Krugman (1980) model
of intra-industry trade. We have isolated the different incentives that drive policy makers’ choices. These
are determined by three main effects: a terms of trade effect, a home market externality and a distortion in
the aggregate allocation due to monopolistic pricing. In addition, our analysis has revealed what the welfare
relevant terms of trade in this model are. Contrary to the point of view of the previous literature, which has
considered the prices of individual varieties in international markets as the terms of trade, we have shown
that policy makers care about aggregate relative price indices of importables and not only about the prices
of varieties. This implies that terms of trade effects and the home market externality coexist even when
considering tariffs and a homogeneous good produced with constant returns that ﬁxes relative factor prices.
Our main contribution has been to show that all previous results on trade policy in the two-sector Krug-
man model depend crucially on the inefﬁciency of the free trade allocation. Indeed, monopolistic distortion
impliesaninefﬁcientlyhighpricelevelandalowvolumeoftrade, thusstrengtheningtheincentivetoagglom-
erate ﬁrms and weakening terms of trade externalities. This leads to the optimality of import tariffs/export
subsidies and production subsidies. Differently, at the efﬁcient allocation, gains from further reduction in
the price level are small while opportunity costs of reducing the production of the homogeneous good are
high (weak home market effect). At the same time, the terms of trade externality becomes strong due to the
high volume of trade. Thus, domestic policy makers optimally choose to set import subsidies/export taxes
and inefﬁciently low production subsidies.
The analysis in this paper sets the foundations for studying strategic trade policy in this set-up. Now that pol-
icy makers’ incentives have been clariﬁed, Nash equilibrium policy outcomes, where many of the incentives
that determine policies are obscured by strategic interaction, can be investigated. We relegate this analysis to
our companion paper, Campolmi et al. (2010).MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 26
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Appendices
A Equilibrium allocation and prices for the case
η = ￿
Under the parametric restrictions η = ￿, it is possible to recover the equilibrium allocations and prices
(and then implicitly single country welfare) as a function of the parameters of the model and of the policy
instruments. Since we are studying production subsidies and tariffs, we set τX = τ∗
X = 1.

























Combining the zero proﬁt conditions (25) and (26) and substituting out the expressions for the relative prices































Using the trade balance condition (35), the labor market clearing condition (31), the equivalent equations for




just derived, we have the following system of
equations in N and N∗:
−L+A1N +A2N∗ = 0 (45)
−L+A∗
2N +A∗
1N∗ = 0 (46)


































I)￿ −τ2 + f ￿ (48)MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK



























































I)￿ −τ2 + f ￿ (51)










where I = W L + T. Substituting (9) and (52) into the utility function, taking logs and disregarding the












An increase in the production subsidy on a one hand increases W due to the reduction in the price level, but
on the other hand it also reduces it due to the negative effect on income.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 29
APPENDICIES
B Production Subsidy τc
We can now proceed to prove the lemmas and theorem relative to the production subsidy. First, we compute
the derivatives of N and N∗ w.r.t. τC and evaluate their sign starting from a symmetric situation τC = τ∗
C.
Lemma 1 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ∗
C ≤ 1 then ∂ N
∂ τC
< 0, ∂ N∗
∂ τC
> 0 and |∂ N∗
∂ τC
|τC=τ∗












































α(τ +τ￿)(τC −1)−τC(τ￿ −τ)
￿ (55)
The denominator of both expressions is negative whenever τC ≤ 1. The numerator of the ﬁrst expression
is always positive being the sum of only positive terms. For the numerator of the second expression to be
positive we would need τC < α1−τ1−￿−2￿











f ￿[α−(α−1)τC]2 < 0
Next, we prove the effects of a change in the production subsidy on relative price of the differentiated goods
and on domestic income.
Lemma 2 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ∗






















































< 0 being the numerator a
sum of positive terms while for the denominator we already proved it to be negative. For the derivative of
income it is enough to remember that I
pz
= L+N￿f (τC −1) and that ∂ N
∂ τC
< 0.





into the different effects as in (41).
Lemma A.1 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ∗
C ≤ 1 then B1 > 0, B2 > 0, B4 < 0 and B5 < 0. If
τC = τ∗
C = 1 or τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ then also B3 < 0.
Proof.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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• B1 > 0: When τC = τ∗
C the equilibrium is symmetric thus there is no trade in the homogeneous
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Before proving the effect on domestic welfare of a change in the domestic production subsidy (Theorem 1),
we derive the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for N > 0 and N∗ > 0 i.e. no specialization in the case in
which τC = ￿−1
￿ and τ∗
C = 1. This will then be used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma A.2 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1, 0 < α < 1, τC = ￿−1
￿ and τ∗















Proof. When τC = ￿−1
￿ and τ∗































































> 0 for all ￿. Also, note that







Moving to N∗, we have that the denominator is always negative when N > 0. Therefore, N∗ is positive when
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which contradicts our initial assumption.

























































































































































































It follows that if 1 > α
















only if ￿−1 ≤ α. This proves that ￿−1 > α is a sufﬁcient
condition for the welfare to be decreasing in the production subsidy. It only remains to show that
another sufﬁcient condition is τ < 4. If 1 ≤ α
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C Import Tariff τI
In this section while retaining the assumptions η = ￿ and τX = τ∗
X, we allow for the use of an import tariff
as main policy instrument.
Lemma 3 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1, 0 < α < 1 and τI = τ∗
I = 1. Then, when τC = τ∗
C = 1 or τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1






























f ￿(τ −τ￿)2 < 0 (58)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂ N
∂ τI




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂ N∗
∂ τI



















(1−α)ατ2 +(α+￿−1)2τ2￿ +(￿2 +α−1)τ1+￿￿











(￿−1)(1−α)τ2 +￿(α+￿−1)τ2￿ +((￿−1)2 +α(2￿−1))τ￿+1￿
f (α+￿−1)2[α(τ +τ￿)+(￿−1)(τ￿ −τ)](τ2 −τ2￿)
< 0 (61)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂ N
∂ τI





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
∂ N∗
∂ τI
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I =1 = − P
pz
(α(1−α)+(￿−1−α)￿)τ2









I =1 = −
Lα(￿−1)τ2(((￿−1)2+2￿(￿−1)+α(2￿−1))τ￿−((￿−1)2−α)τ)
(α+￿−1)2(τ￿−τ)(τ￿+τ)((α+￿−1)τ￿+(α−￿+1)τ) < 0
Lemma A.3 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ∗
C = 1 or τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ then B1 < 0, B2 < 0, B3 > 0
and B5 > 0. If τC = τ∗
C = 1 then B4 = 0 while if τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ then B4 > 0.
Proof.









































































































































































= L + (τ∗





C −1)￿f ∂ N∗
∂ τI
≥ 0.









































































































Theorem 2 Let τ > 1, ￿ > 1 and 0 < α < 1 and τI = τ∗
I = 1. If τC = τ∗
C = 1, then ∂ W
∂ τI
> 0. However, if
τC = τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ , then ∂ W
∂ τI
< 0.
















((α(τ￿+τ)+(￿−1)(τ￿−τ))(τ2￿−τ2) < 0.MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/6 35
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Figure 1
Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic production subsidy when τ∗
C = 1.












































































































































































Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic production subsidy when τ∗
C = ￿−1
￿ .
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Figure 3




























Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic tariff when τC = τ∗
C = 1.
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Figure 5
Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic tariff when τC = τ∗
C = (￿−1)/￿.















































































































































































Domestic tariff/ subsidy on imports when τC = τ∗
C = τ∗
I = 1.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Figure 7
Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic export tax when τC = τ∗
C = τ∗
X = 1.
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Figure 9
Optimal Export tax/subsidy when τC = τ∗
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